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AVOIDING SECURITY ATTACKS IN PROXIMITY REPORTING AND CONTACT 














In connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, contact tracing mobile 
applications (e.g., that leverage Wi-Fi and Bluetooth™ Low Energy (BLE)) are being 
deployed.  Many of those applications are susceptible to different security attacks.  To 
address those types of challenges, techniques are presented herein that provide a multi-
tiered mechanism for an optimized genuine client neighbor filtering technique that, among 
other things, may detect, score, and filter fake BLE advertisement attacks to improve the 
efficacy of the overall contact tracing application ecosystem and reduce airtime utilization 
from fake advertisements in the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) frequency bands.  
For example, a man-in-the-middle (MITM) or other adversary may attach a mobile device 
to a carrier (such as a dog, car, flying drone, etc.) that advertises proximity identifiers to 
the devices of unsuspecting people.  Additionally, the presented techniques address device 
power and storage drain that are associated with denial-of-service attacks involving a large 
volume of messages. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
As a part of ongoing COVID-19 pandemic many contact tracing mobile 
applications using a Wi-Fi and BLE ecosystem are appearing in the market place.  
Although different vendors are jointly working towards an application programming 
interface (API) and BLE service-based advertisement mechanism, there are different 
security attacks which can occur.  Such attacks are formulated to use intricate settings to 
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avoid privacy concerns and when a user chooses to bypass such a privacy intrusion the 
security threat actor can create a de-anonymization attack. 
Tracking and de-anonymization attacks are intended to violate privacy.  Such 
attacks in one case rely on false positive alert injections and offer other security mitigation 
strategies.  Although research has shown how false alert injections may be mitigated by 
correlation techniques, it is still possible to create such a security attack in the BLE beacon 
framework.  The existing mitigation techniques rely on client-side power boosting or 
increasing the signal strength or the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) which eventually will drain 
the battery life of a client and as such are not a scalable idea.  Aspects of the techniques 
presented herein leverage a BLE-enabled API or gateway and Wi-Fi infrastructure-based 
solution to address such challenges.  Aspects of the techniques presented herein support a 
multi-tiered security solution strategy that, among other things, mitigates client power drain 
and detects trolling (e.g., a trolling dog, a drone flying, etc.) security attacks before a 
vendor’s API-based BLE advertisement beacon is genuinely triggered for a COVID-19 
contact tracing use case. 
The asynchronous change of a Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) and a 
Rolling Proximity Identifier (RPI) in the GAEN exposure notification system are causing 
this security vulnerability issue as the attacker can use this ‘asynchronous behavior’ to 
manipulate the next RPI value, which is supposed to be secured, and with this they can 
either (i) create false positive-based security attacks to skew the COVID-19 positive 
numbers or (ii) keep a track of person thus intruding upon their privacy.   
For example, the timing of a BD_ADDR and a 16 byte RPI is very critical for every 
15 minute rolling duration to detect these security attacks and hence the BLE time-based 
fingerprinting with a rolling table (as described below) is important for a network manager 
vendor’s business value to enable a cleaner application ecosystem with different 
technology partners. 
It is important to note that such attacks are not unique to COVID-19.  However, the 
recent attention given to contact tracing security and privacy risks highlight the 
significance of the techniques presented herein.  It will be apparent that various of the 
techniques presented herein may be applied to other generic security attacks which use a 
similar RPI-like framework. 
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These two problems are avoided through the use of aspects of the techniques 
presented herein, thus providing for the ability to build applications and analytic 
dashboards for a COVID-19 contact tracing framework.  In particular, aspects of the 
techniques presented herein support, among other things, cleaner (e.g., verified and 
validated data about COVID-19 positive exposure) data being provided by a network 
manager vendor, enhanced false positive-based security threat detection feature in rolling 
time slots with keys stored in a cloud data store, etc. 
For purposes of clarity, in the narrative that follows RPI will refer to a 16 byte value 
as described in an exposure notification framework.  If a fake BLE advertiser (like, for 
example, a trolling dog or a flying drone) continuously emits spoofed BLE advertisements 
to create more false positive-based security attacks in a COVID-19 exposure notification 
framework as described above (e.g., trolling attack by dogs or drones, intentional power 
drain attack, etc.) then the BLE API on the other end can automatically filter such fake 
false positives by employing aspects of the techniques presented herein and would be able 
to capture and filter such a security threat in, for example, a smart city-based Internet-of-
things (IoT) deployment or an enterprise deployment. 
Figure 1, below, depicts aspects of the detection and filtering of security attacks 
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Figure 1: Detecting and Filtering Security Attacks in a Contact Tracing Framework 
 
Based on the numerical correlation analysis of a past BD_ADDR, a present 
BD_ADDR, and the timing correlation analysis of an RPI and a BD_ADDR for every 15 
minutes (as described below) the BLE service can decide if a unique rolling key for contact 
tracking should be generated for a device (as shown in Figure 1, above) and stored in a 
local application.  This same key is used for a BLE beacon-based advertisement and 
eventually stored in a cloud data store for historical analysis at a later point in time (as 
shown in Figure 2, below). 
In any BLE advertisement the advertising data refers to the (0 to 31 byte) long 
payload that is available for application use.  In the Bluetooth Core specification this field 
is referred to as AdvData.  Aspects of the techniques presented herein may conduct a deep 
inspection of the AD Field (0x1A) which refers to the advertising interval (see, for example, 
the Bluetooth Core Specification: Core Specification Supplement, Part A, section 1.15) 
from the received BLE Advertisement beacon messages. 
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BLE tags and devices transmit advertising packets on a selectable interval that is as 
short as 20 milliseconds (ms) or as long as several minutes.  The same advertisement packet 
is sent on all three of the advertising channels (37, 38, and 39) every time that a device 
advertises, making it more likely that any receiver or scanner will pick it up.  A user's 
presence state from a mobile application is embedded in a 16 byte proximity-based 
universally unique identifier (UUID). 
Based on the received UUID, rolling proximity identifier, sender media access 
control (MAC) address, and advertising interval consecutively in every channel (37, 38, 
and 39), a table may be created.  Figure 2a, below, depicts aspects of an illustrative 
fingerprint table comprising, among other things, a BLE advertisement timer, a UUID, and 
an RPI-based rolling index. 
 
 
Figure 2a: Illustrative Fingerprint Table 
 
If there is a fake BLE advertisement with a spoofed UUID and sender’s address to 
match with the original along with a rolling proximity identifier, then the variations in the 
BLE Adv_Interval that are captured from multiple readers (e.g., various access points 
(Aps), Alice and Bob's smartphone, etc.) can be collated by the cloud backend service to 
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compare the Adv_Pattern by creating a Table (e.g., a "timer based BLE advertisement 
anomaly detection table"). 
Since a genuine BLE Beacon will have a standard Adv_Interval rotation technique 
(between 20 ms and one minute), with multiple input data collected about both genuine 
UUIDs and fake UUIDs (from, for example, Alice, Bob, neighboring Aps, etc.) it is easier 
to predict a fake BLE beacon. 
As shown in Figure 2a, above, and in Figure 2b, below, if a fake BLE UUID is 
detected by the in sync and out of sync "timer based BLE advertisement anomaly detection 
table" in the cloud backend, then a Simple Objects Access Protocol (SOAP) API-based 
alert may be triggered to a contact tracing application that is running on a smartphone to 
stop deriving the rolling proximity identifier from the unique contact tracing key for that 
particular time duration.  This would ensure that an anomalous trigger of a false positive 
(e.g., COVID-19 positive) based proximity BLE advertisement alert would prevent the 




Figure 2b: Illustrative Fingerprint Table 
 
Under aspects of the techniques presented herein the creation of a 15 minute timer-
based BLE advertisement map or table to analyze anomalies that are based on various 
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attributes (such as, for example, UUID, Adv_Interval, sender address, BLE MAC address, 
rolling proximity identifier, etc.) is of particular note. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein leverage the BLE 5.0 specification’s 
advertisement interval to derive a "time synchronized BLE beacons received table or list " 
by a neighboring Client (e.g., Bob as one example).  If there is a timing variation in a BLE 
advertisement that is received by a neighboring client at time 't' as opposed to what is 
defined in the ‘time synchronized BLE beacon advertisement map’ then such a BLE 
advertisement can be ignored for contact tracing packet flow (as described above) and the 
unique RPI that was received in the BLE advertisement would be ignored (not saved) by 
the neighboring BLE smartphone client (e.g., a local application).  The unique rolling key 
packet identifier would not be stored in the cloud data store backend for contact tracing 
based on people's exposure data (e.g., a 14 to 15 day period). 
BLE beacons that are advertised or received by any client are compared with its 
own ‘advertisement timing schedule template’ from other neighboring BLE beacons or 
elsewhere (e.g., a Wi-Fi AP and a BLE AP/IoT gateway, etc.).  Only the BLE beacons that 
match the template that is described below will be honored, all others would be ignored.  
The template may be: 
1) Only the BLE beacons that are advertised with a unique rolling key for contact 
tracing and which match the timing and numerical correlation analysis of 
BD_ADDR and RPI as depicted above. 
2) Only the BLE beacons which are received and which match the BLE timing 
schedule or template that is stored by the client.  Such a BLE advertisement 
time map or template may be shared through a representational state transfer 
(REST) API to a cloud-based backend service to store such table data and 
exchange it with other clients.  Different cloud service vendors have existing 
API services to consume such data coming in from the client ecosystems and 
backend application. 
For example, a smartphone client may use a length/type/data field in the 
smartphone operating system to accomplish this by giving a contact tracing application the 
possibility to ‘subscribe’ to a particular UUID and receive a notification if an advertiser 
with that UUID appears in close proximity.  Through aspects of the techniques presented 
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herein, by inspecting the advertised data during a multitier validation, one can ensure that 
the false positives and troll-like BLE advertisement security attacks are nullified in a real 
time public Wi-Fi and BLE environment (such as, for example, a smart city or an 
enterprise). 
Under aspects of the techniques presented herein, the table comparison triggering 
the packet workflow from a cloud backend to a BLE client Infra via a vendor's AP or IoT 
gateway is of particular note.  Unlike an enterprise rogue context, in a public WIFI or BLE 
IoT deployment its practically impossible to physically identify and remove such rogue 
threat actors like stray dogs or drones with equipment that is tagged trying to create a 
security attack.  Under aspects of the techniques presented herein, taking an adaptive, data-
driven decision on when to generate and store the rolling key identifier and when to pause 
or ignore the generation, filtering, and saving of a rolling key identifier or RPI for a specific 
duration when the attack vector is in proximity is of particular node. 
By avoiding such troll and battery drain attacks from a Wi-Fi or BLE client 
smartphone, battery power is improved as the BLE reader backend service in the mobile 
application will use the data-driven logic that was described above to ignore the fake BLE 
UUID advertisements which are meant to create false positives. 
Figure 3a, below, depicts elements of a BLE timing-based ‘pebble’ attack. 
 
 
Figure 3a: Illustrative BLE Timing-Based ‘Pebble’ Attack 
 
Figure 3b, below, continues from Figure 3a, above, and depicts elements of an 
asynchronous BLE ‘pebble’ message security attack. 
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Figure 3b: Illustrative Asynchronous BLE ‘Pebble’ Message Security Attack 
 
As described above, the prediction of an RPI based on correlation techniques is a 
security threat as it can be used to create spoof attacks to skew a COVID-19 positive rate 
in a geofenced region.  Hence there is a need for a filtering mechanism within the 15 minute 
time slot as provided through aspects of the techniques presented herein. 
Figure 3c, below, continues from Figures 3a and 3b, above, and depicts further 
elements of an attack. 
 
 
Figure 3c: Illustrative BLE Attack 
 
Figure 4, below, presents a network manager-based analytics workflow for a 
security threat detection and filtering mechanism. 
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Figure 4: Exemplary Threat Detection and Filtering Workflow 
 
A BLE security attack of the type that was described above can be done for a 
maximum time period of 15 minutes as per the BLE 5.0 specification and an exposure 
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notification framework.  Even though a BLE message is encrypted with a temporal rotation, 
the increase in speed of this rotation would not solve the ‘detection of BLE security attack’ 
problem.  The security threat is more towards the manipulation of an RPI (16 byte value) 
based on the ‘pebble BLE BD_ADDR’ and a past BD_ADDR.  This security attack should 
be addressed as it is a privacy violation and can skew up COVID-19 positive numbers 
globally in existing exposure notification frameworks for COVID-19 applications. 
In connection with the techniques presented herein, of particular interest and note 
in the descriptions and the figures that were presented in the above narrative are, for 
example: 
1) The identification of a BD_ADDR source of a spoofed or manipulated BLE 
advertisement with the proposed technique.  The identification of a source is 
important as the unique rolling keys and RPI corresponding to that source can 
then be ignored and not saved in a cloud data store. 
2) The creation of a BLE advertisement timer and an RPI-based fingerprinting 
table or database are important in order to address the security issues that were 
described above (see, for example, Figures 2a and 2b, above, and Figure 5, 
below). 
3) The identification of which ‘exact time duration’ in a 15 minute slot of a BLE 
advertisement is spoofed in, for example, a 24/7 smart city public Wi-Fi and 
BLE AP infrastructure deployment (as the unique rolling key derived in that 15 
minute slot can then be ignored as described above).  
4) The identification of the unique rolling key that is received from the list of BLE 
beacons as seen by the smartphone (of, for example, Alice and Bob) and 
deciding which unique rolling key is a genuine COVID-19 positive and which 
unique rolling key is a false positive.  The specific key that is identified 
important as that value is ignored and need not be stored in a cloud list.  All of 
the other clients in the vicinity who are downloading the list from a cloud server 
would thus have genuine COVID-19 positive exposure data only.  In this way, 
security attacks creating false positives are avoided in a BLE-based contact 
tracing framework. 
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5) The derivation of a risk score based on the number of RPI inconsistencies seen 
within the 15 minute time slot with machine learning (ML) based techniques is 
valuable to network manager vendor’s business as any application partners 
would be interested to parse the "risk score profiled data" to decide on how to 
use a REST API-exposed data store for creating a dashboard application for a 
COVID-19 positive contact tracing framework.  For the sake of simplicity, 
under aspects of the techniques presented herein the risk score may be increased 
by one if one RPI inconsistency is seen and then in steps of one for a 15 minute 
time slot.  Alternatively, a network manager may sample this risk score counter 
value every 15 minutes to decide which particular RPI key should be stored in 
a cloud data store which is eventually exposed to different application data 
partners who, for example, build applications and dashboards on COVID-19 
analytics.  Such a derived risk score based on the sampling and cleaning of BLE 
data to remove the security attack-based data sample from incoming a 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) payload into a network manager is of 
particular importance.  It is important to note that other risk scoring models may 
also be considered in connection with a network manager vendor’s analytics. 
6) The removal (after a spoofed BLE entry in every 15 minute sample is identified 
based on fingerprinting analysis, as described above) of the corresponding 
anomalous ‘key – rolling key’ entry from the table and so the anomalous unique 
contact tracing key is not stored in the final list in the cloud data store.  (An 
illustrative packet flow is described below.)  When the final list of COVID-19 
positive exposure-based keys is automatically downloaded by other clients in 
the vicinity, the automatic false positive notifications of a COVID-19 positive 
exposure is nullified, thereby avoiding a panic situation. 
For purposes of illustration, consider a hypothetical packet flow involving a Wi-
Fi/BLE AP, sensor, or BLE beacon can include rolling table creation, computation, and out 
of sync anomaly detection based on data analytics, as generally illustrated via Figure 5, 
below. Using an NBAPI or RESTAPI, information is provided to a cloud application server 
and a filtered list of genuine ‘rolling key’ entries alone are present in time-based tables in 
a cloud data store.  Thereafter, time based rolling keys are downloaded by partner 
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Figure 5: Example Flow 
 
Any security attacks based on false positives are nullified using the BLE 
fingerprinting and risk score-based filtering mechanisms as encompassed under various of 
the techniques that are presented herein. 
It is important to note that the processing of the raw payload will be used to 
determine if the BLE beacon that is seen in the contract tracing application in genuine. It 
is also important to note that the time-based BLE advertisement fingerprinting approach in 
a rolling slot basis with the unique rolling key identifier as the primary key for a table 
provides for quick indexing to filter any outliers (e.g., false positive data). 
Figure 6, below, presents aspects of a 15 minute rolling time slotted window-based 
filtering mechanism of received BLE advertisement messages. 
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Figure 6: Exemplary Rolling Time Slotted Filtering Mechanism 
 
In connection with aspects of the techniques presented herein, it is also important 
to note that it is not necessary to observe a ‘static UUID’ in any neighborhood (e.g., an 
airport or other environments) for some specific amount of time (e.g., 45 minutes).  Rather, 
from a randomized set of UUIDs that are seen it is possible to identify which UUID is 
spoofed based on a ‘numerical and timing correlation analysis’ as described above in a 15 
minute slot of rolling interval to ‘filter’ the specific spoofed UUID corresponding to an 
RPI entry from the table from which it is derived (e.g., by doing a reverse lookup). 
As described and illustrated in the narrative above, the techniques that are presented 
herein offer a number of valuable capabilities, including: 
1) Detection methods.  As depicted in, for example, Figures 2, 3, and 4 (all above) 
a numerical correlation analysis of RPI values and BD_ADDR values (both old 
and new) for every 15 minute duration to identify the presence of a spoofed 
attack entry of UUID.  Additionally, a timing synchronization check between a 
RPI and a BD_ADDR to identify the security attack or spoof in every 15 minute 
slot over a duration of 45 mins (e.g., out of sync as depicted in Figure 2b, above). 
2) Filtering methods.  As depicted in, for example, Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 (all above) 
an RPI entry that is found (according to the techniques that were described 
above) is filtered so that it is not stored in the cloud application data store for 
14 days.  A network manager’s filtering of such detected RPI key for every 15 
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minutes in the JSON data that is exposed via a Northbound API (NBAPI) is 
important as an RPI value is the unique entry used by the exposure notification 
framework for contact tracing.  As depicted in Figure 5, above, a time-based 
BLE advertisement fingerprinting approach in a rolling slot basis for every 15 
minutes with the unique rolling key identifier as the primary key for the table 
allows for quick indexing to filter the outlier data (e.g., false positive data). 
3) Risk score profiling.  As depicted in, for example, Figures 2, 3, and 4 (all above) 
deriving a risk score based on the number of RPI inconsistencies that are seen 
within a 15 minute time slot using ML-based techniques is important and 
valuable to a network manager vendor’s business as any application partners 
are interested to parse this derived ‘Risk score profiled data’ to decide on how 
to use an exposed REST API for creating a dashboard application for COVID-
19 positive infections with the network manager as a part of a COVID-19 
contact tracing framework.  Existing partners and customers are interested in 
such cleansed BLE data.  The derived risk score profiling can be appended to 
the JSON data that is exposed to a customer through, for example, NBAPI or a 
REST API for consumption by application partners. 
In summary, techniques have been presented that provide a multi-tiered mechanism 
for an optimized genuine client neighbor filtering technique that, among other things, may 
detect, score, and filter fake BLE advertisement attacks to improve the efficacy of the 
overall contact tracing application ecosystem and also to reduce airtime utilization from 
fake advertisements in the ISM frequency bands.  For example, a MITM or other adversary 
that attaches a mobile device to a carrier (such as a dog, car, flying drone, etc.) that 
advertises proximity identifiers to the devices of unsuspecting people as part of a network 
security attack by leveraging a BLE based application ecosystem of a COVID-19 contact 
tracing framework can be addressed using techniques as described herein.  Additionally, 
the presented techniques address device power and storage drain that are associated with 
denial-of-service attacks involving a large volume of messages. 
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